Quantstamp Announcements

Crypto lost more than $240 million across 29 incidents in July 2026, up roughly 216% from June's $75.87M, even as the number of attacks fell from 40 to 29. For the second month running, the damage didn't come from clever contract exploits. The same failure class ran through Web2, from a $12.3M rail-industry ransom to a 1TB bank breach that started with one employee's email.Here's the month in security 👇

$75.32M was lost across 32 crypto incidents in June, up from May's $59.52M. No coordinated campaign carried the month, but one targeted operation did. A targeted social-engineering attack against Humanity Protocol reached the keys behind the $H token and drained $32M, roughly 42% of every dollar lost in June. Quantstamp led the independent investigation and traced the tooling to a phishing campaign previously seen targeting macOS users. Offchain, a fresh npm supply chain wave hit Red Hat's packages on the first day of the month, and a PeopleSoft zero-day was exploited for two weeks before Oracle said a word. Here's the month in security 👇

$59.52M was lost across 29 crypto incidents, down sharply from April's ~$635M. No single hack carried the month. The bigger story happened off-chain, where a self-propagating npm worm called Mini Shai-Hulud kept resurfacing in new waves through the month, ultimately spanning more than 1,000 malicious package versions across the npm ecosystem.

April was undoubtedly a rocky month in security. $635M was lost across 28 crypto incidents. The Axios npm package was compromised on day one, exposing an estimated 600,000 installs in three hours. Vercel was breached through a third party. Three major CVEs under active exploitation. Here's the month in security 👇

Web3 is different from “normal software” for one brutal reason: bugs turn directly into money. In 2025 alone, an estimated $3.4B was stolen through crypto exploits. That incentive creates a uniquely hostile environment where attackers systematize vulnerability search.

Decentralized applications (dApps) (e.g., DEXes) increasingly span multiple Ethereum-compatible chains, such as a number of L2s. Although these chains are intended to be compatible with the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), subtle differences in opcode implementations can significantly alter smart contract behavior and security. This poses an important question: how can developers efficiently code and manage smart contracts targeting different chains?